Opinion of Advocate General – 26 February 2026 – Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort (VG Wort) v TL, Case C‑840/24

– The request for a preliminary ruling was submitted by the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany) and concerns the interpretation of provisions of Directive 2001/29/EC, Directive 2006/115/EC and Directive 2014/26/EU relating to private copying compensation, remuneration for public lending and the permitted uses of rights revenue managed by a collective management organisation.

– The dispute arose from VG Wort’s practice between 1 January 2016 and 30 September 2019 of allocating a portion of the rights revenue which it collected – specifically revenue derived from fair compensation for private copying and remuneration for public lending of scientific, technical and specialist works – to the Förderungsfonds Wissenschaft der VG Wort GmbH (FFW), a company wholly owned by VG Wort. FFW funded activities promoting science and research, including printing cost grants, research support and initiatives relating to scientific and specialist literature, as well as grants for doctoral theses relating to copyright.

– The payments made to FFW amounted to approximately 0.51% of VG Wort’s rights revenue during the period concerned. The subsidies were financed by deductions from compensation for private copying and remuneration for public lending.

– TL and OS, both authors and members of VG Wort, contested these deductions on the ground that they unlawfully reduced their distributions. TL sought a declaration that VG Wort was not entitled to reduce distributions by making payments to FFW and requested information on the sums transferred.

– The first‑instance court partially upheld the claims. It considered that VG Wort’s distribution plans amounted to general terms and conditions and that the provisions relating to FFW payments were null and void under national law because they infringed core principles governing collective management organisations by permitting payments to persons who were not entitled to them.

– Hearing the appeal by way of Revision, the referring court considered that such payments could be lawful under national legislation requiring collective management organisations to promote science and culture. However, that would be contingent on the compatibility of such legislation with EU law, specifically with Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29, the first sentence of Article 6(1) of Directive 2006/115 and Article 11(4) and Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/26.

– The first question referred asked whether Member State legislation allowing a collective management organisation to promote works of cultural importance in a way that may also benefit persons who are not rightholders is compatible with those provisions of EU law.

– The Advocate General began by emphasising the specific societal and cultural role of literary and artistic property and the traditional social, cultural and educational functions of collective management organisations, which extend beyond the mere distribution of rights revenue. These functions, rooted in longstanding international practice, include promoting cultural development and supporting educational and scientific initiatives.

– The Advocate General noted that Directive 2014/26 expressly recognises the cultural role of collective management organisations, and that deductions from rights revenue may be used to fund social, cultural or educational services, provided that such services are based on fair criteria and that deductions are reasonable.

– Examining Article 11(4) and Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/26, the Advocate General concluded that these provisions permit Member States to allow collective management organisations to allocate part of the rights revenue to cultural and educational activities, including where such activities may benefit persons who are not rightholders, provided that rightholders continue to receive fair compensation and adequate remuneration.

– As regards Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29, the Advocate General observed that Member States enjoy wide discretion in designing compensation systems for private copying due to the inherent uncertainty in calculating the precise harm caused by private copying. In that context, allocating a reasonably limited share of the private copying levy to cultural or educational initiatives is permissible so long as rightholders ultimately receive fair compensation.

– With respect to Article 6(1) of Directive 2006/115, the Advocate General noted that Member States similarly possess broad discretion in determining remuneration for public lending and that such remuneration may also be distributed indirectly through social or cultural institutions benefiting rightholders. Accordingly, part of that revenue may likewise be allocated to cultural or educational activities that may benefit non‑rightholders.

– The Advocate General therefore proposed that the answer to the first question should be that Article 11(4) and Article 12(4) of Directive 2014/26, read together with Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29 and Article 6(1) of Directive 2006/115, do not preclude national legislation allowing a collective management organisation to allocate part of the rights revenue to cultural activities benefiting persons who are not copyright holders, provided rightholders receive fair compensation and adequate remuneration.

– The second question referred concerned whether, if such cultural and educational services were permissible only for rightholders, their availability would depend on the existence of a present right to remuneration or a management contract with the collective management organisation. The Advocate General stated that, even if such a limitation applied, it would cover all rightholders whose rights fall within the relevant organisation’s scope of activity and would not require a present right to remuneration or a contractual relationship. However, as the Advocate General’s answer to the first question renders this unnecessary, he addressed it only for completeness.

– The Advocate General concluded by proposing that the Court rule that Member State legislation permitting collective management organisations to allocate part of rights revenue derived from fair compensation and remuneration to cultural activities benefiting non‑rightholders is compatible with EU law, provided that rightholders receive, directly or indirectly, fair compensation and adequate remuneration.

Case details: https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/document/C/2024/C-0840-24-00000000RP-01-P-01/CONCL/316864-EN-1-html

 

Judgment – 25 February 2026 – PFP Monaco v EUIPO, Case T‑298/25

– The case concerned opposition proceedings relating to the application for registration of the EU word sign BRAMANI, filed on 5 July 2022 for goods in Classes 24 and 25 of the Nice Classification.

– The application covered, in Class 24, a wide range of textile fabrics and textile goods, including knitted fabrics, woven fabrics, waterproof fabrics, breathable waterproof fabrics, elastic fabrics, and various textile piece goods intended for the manufacture of clothing, footwear, furnishings, and protective garments. In Class 25, the application covered an extensive list of clothing, headgear and footwear items such as sports caps, beach shoes, pumps, jackets, trousers, sportswear, dresses, leather clothing, scarves, gloves, suits, shirts and socks.

– On 30 September 2022, Stanton SAS filed a notice of opposition basing on the earlier EU word mark BRAHMA, registered for goods in Classes 18 and 25. The earlier mark covered, in Class 18, “Leather and imitations of leather, and goods made of these materials”, as well as items such as trunks, rucksacks, umbrellas, parasols, walking sticks, whips, harness and saddlery, and, in Class 25, “Dresses; articles of footwear; headgear”.

– The opposition was based on Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001, alleging a likelihood of confusion stemming from the similarity of the signs and the similarity or identity of the goods.

– On 2 April 2024, the Opposition Division partially upheld the opposition and refused registration of the mark applied for with respect to the goods mentioned above.

– The applicant filed an appeal before EUIPO, which the Fifth Board of Appeal dismissed by the contested decision of 11 March 2025. The Board of Appeal found a likelihood of confusion for the Spanish‑speaking part of the public in the European Union. It held that the goods were identical or similar to varying degrees. It also found that the signs were visually similar to an average degree; phonetically similar to an above‑average degree and that the conceptual comparison was neutral.

– The applicant brought an action before the General Court seeking annulment of the contested decision and registration of the mark applied for in respect of the goods in question.

– The General Court examined the case on the basis of settled case‑law, according to which likelihood of confusion must be assessed globally, taking account of all relevant factors, including the interdependence between similarity of the signs and similarity of the goods, and the perception of the relevant public.

– As regards the relevant public, the Court noted that the relevant territory was the whole European Union, but confirmed that the Board of Appeal was entitled to rely on the perception of the Spanish‑speaking public. It held that certain goods in Class 24 were directed at professionals in the textile, fashion or manufacturing sectors with a high level of attention, whereas other goods in the same class could also target private individuals (such as hobbyists) with an average to above‑average level of attention. Goods in Class 25 were intended for the general public with an average level of attention.

– As for the comparison of the goods, the Court upheld the Board of Appeal’s findings that the goods in Class 25 were identical or similar to those covered by the earlier mark in the same class. The Court also confirmed that goods in Class 24 were similar to an average degree to the goods “leather and imitations of leather” in Class 18, reasoning that both categories consist of raw materials used for manufacturing in the fashion and furnishings sectors and are interchangeable for such purposes.

– The Court found that the signs BRAMANI and BRAHMA were visually similar to an average degree due to the common sequences “bra” and “ma” appearing in the same order and positions. The differences (presence of “h” in the earlier mark and “ni” in the sign applied for) did not offset the similarities.

– Phonetically, the Court confirmed an above‑average degree of similarity. It found that the letter “h” in BRAHMA is silent in Spanish, resulting in the earlier mark’s pronunciation being wholly included within that of BRAMANI, with differences confined to the additional syllable “ni”.

– Conceptually, the comparison was neutral. Although “Brahma” may be recognised by part of the public as referring to a Hindu concept or deity, the applicant did not establish that such knowledge would be widespread among Spanish‑speaking consumers. BRAMANI had no meaning for that public.The earlier mark had a normal degree of inherent distinctiveness.

– In its global assessment, the Court held that the Board of Appeal was correct to find a likelihood of confusion. Even for professional consumers displaying a high level of attention, the similarity of the signs and goods was sufficient to give rise to such a likelihood, given that consumers rely on imperfect recollection and do not analyse signs in minute detail.

– The Court therefore confirmed that, for a non‑negligible part of the relevant public, there was a likelihood of confusion in relation to the goods in Classes 24 and 25 covered by the contested application. The General Court thus dismissed the action in its entirety.

Case details: https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/document/T/2025/T-0298-25-00000000PI-01-P-01/ARRET_NP/316779-EN-1-html

 

Judgment – 25 February 2026 – Viva Credit IFN SA v EUIPO, Case T‑72/25

– The case concerned revocation proceedings relating to the EU figurative mark Vivawallet, registered on 12 December 2015 for a wide range of services in Classes 35, 36, 38, 39, 41 and 42. The contested sign was a figurative mark:

– On 6 April 2022, Viva Credit IFN SA filed an application for revocation under Article 58(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1001, alleging lack of genuine use within a continuous five‑year period.

– On 2 October 2023, the Cancellation Division partially upheld the application and revoked the contested mark for the services referred to in the initial specification.

– On 4 December 2023, the intervener, Viva Wallet AE Symmetochon – Anaptyxis Logismikoy, appealed. By decision of 27 November 2024, the Fourth Board of Appeal partially upheld the appeal, restoring protection for a substantial part of the services in Classes 35, 36, 38, 39, 41 and 42. The Board of Appeal accepted additional evidence submitted on appeal and found that the contested mark had been put to genuine use during the period from 6 April 2017 to 5 April 2022 in the territory of the European Union, principally in Greece, and also in Cyprus and Romania.

– The applicant brought action before the General Court seeking partial annulment of the contested decision, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to establish genuine use regarding the place, extent and nature of use, and that the Board of Appeal had failed to provide adequate reasoning.

– The Court held that the Board of Appeal had set out the facts and legal considerations necessary for the applicant to understand the basis of the decision and for the Court to exercise judicial review. The fact that certain service categories were analysed individually and others collectively did not amount to contradictory or insufficient reasoning.

– Regarding the place of use, the Court confirmed the Board of Appeal’s assessment that the totality of the evidence demonstrated use in Greece and also in other Member States, including Cyprus and Romania.

– As to the extent of use, the Court upheld the Board of Appeal’s findings that the volume, frequency and duration of use were sufficiently evidenced. The record showed, inter alia, emails to clients, press articles, website activity, transaction volumes, customer numbers, and information concerning the issuance of prepaid and debit cards.

– In respect of the nature of use, the Court held that the contested mark had been used publicly and outwardly as a trade mark. Even when appearing in the intervener’s company name, the sign Vivawallet established a link between the services provided and their commercial origin and thus constituted use of the trade mark.

– The Court then examined the use of the contested mark for each relevant class of services, confirming that the Board of Appeal had correctly identified subcategories and assessed the evidence as follows:

– Class 35: The mark was genuinely used for compiling offers via a digital platform, for commercial and marketing services, and for brokerage and intermediation relating to electronic payments.

– Class 36: The evidence showed genuine use for non‑electronic payment services, payment administration, money remittance, issuing and acquiring of payment instruments, clearing and reconciling transactions, and related financial services.

– Class 38: The Board of Appeal was correct to find genuine use for electronic communication services related to payment services, including communication channels enabling card transactions and user identification.

– Class 39: The intervener had used the mark for travel agency services, including the making, management and facilitation of bookings and reservations for transportation, accommodation and events.

– Class 41: The mark had been used for reservation and booking services including non‑electronic issuance of tickets.

– Class 42: The evidence demonstrated use for providing temporary access to authentication software required for the provision of online financial services and user verification.

– The General Court concluded that the Board of Appeal had correctly applied Article 58(1)(a) and (2) and that the evidence, when assessed globally, established genuine use of the contested mark for the services identified in the contested decision.

– Thus, the General Court dismissed the action in its entirety.

Case details: https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/document/T/2025/T-0072-25-00000000PI-01-P-01/ARRET_NP/316776-EN-1-html