13/04 – 17/04

T-410/25 Vitabalans / EUIPO – Hasco TM (Ibumax-Lysin)

• The case concerned opposition proceedings against the application for the EU word mark Ibumax-Lysin.
• Vitabalans Oy applied for the mark for goods in Class 5 of the Nice Classification, namely ibuprofen for use as an oral analgesic.
• Hasco TM sp. z o.o. sp.k. opposed registration relying, inter alia, on the earlier Polish word mark ibum, registered for Class 5 goods including pharmaceutical preparations and analgesics.
• The opposition was based in particular on Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001, namely likelihood of confusion.
• The Opposition Division upheld the opposition and the EUIPO Board of Appeal dismissed Vitabalans Oy’s appeal. It found the goods identical because ibuprofen for use as an oral analgesic fell within the broader category of analgesics.
• The Board of Appeal considered that the common element “ibu” could be perceived as referring to ibuprofen and had a low degree of distinctive character, while “max” and “lysin” in the applied-for mark were descriptive and devoid of distinctive character.
• The applicant argued that “ibu” was a commonly used abbreviation for ibuprofen, that the additional elements “max” and “lysin” distinguished the signs, that the earlier mark had weak distinctive character, and that the signs coexisted on the market.
• The General Court dismissed the action. It held that the goods were identical and that the earlier mark ibum was entirely included at the beginning of Ibumax-Lysin, which supported a finding of similarity between the signs.
• Despite the descriptive character of “max” and “lysin” and the weak distinctive character of “ibu”, the Court confirmed a low degree of visual, phonetic and conceptual similarity.
• The Court also held that ibum had acquired a high degree of distinctive character through long-standing use and strong recognition among the Polish public for analgesics. The evidence showed intensive use in Poland, high recognition and significant promotional activity.
• Given the identity of the goods, the low similarity of the signs and the enhanced distinctive character of the earlier mark, consumers were likely to perceive Ibumax-Lysin as a variant of ibum or as a product line from the same undertaking.
• The coexistence argument was rejected because the applicant had not produced sufficient evidence before EUIPO showing actual coexistence capable of excluding a likelihood of confusion. Marketing authorisation for a product named Ibumax-Lysin was irrelevant for trade mark assessment.
• The General Court therefore upheld the Board of Appeal’s decision and dismissed the action in its entirety.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025TJ0410

 

T-461/25 Instanta / EUIPO – Heineken España (LEONHART)

• The case concerned opposition proceedings against the application for the EU word mark LEONHART.
• Instanta sp. z o.o. applied for LEONHART for goods in Classes 30 and 32. Heineken España, SA opposed the application on the basis of the earlier Spanish figurative mark EL LEON, registered inter alia for Class 32 goods.
• The opposition relied on Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. The Opposition Division upheld the opposition and the Board of Appeal dismissed Instanta’s appeal.
• The Board of Appeal found that the relevant public comprised the general and professional public in Spain with an average level of attention, and that the goods were identical or similar to an average degree.
• It considered LEONHART and EL LEON to be visually, phonetically and conceptually similar to an average degree, because the common element “leon” would be understood by Spanish consumers as “lion”, while “hart” had no meaning for them.
• The applicant argued that the Board had wrongly assessed similarity, giving insufficient weight to the graphic stylisation of the earlier mark and to the element “hart”, which was significant in the overall impression of LEONHART.
• The General Court upheld the action. It first rejected as inadmissible the argument and evidence concerning a possible association between “hart” and the Spanish word “harto”, since they were raised for the first time before the Court.
• On the merits, the Court held that the Board of Appeal had overstated the similarity of the signs. Although the signs shared the letters “leon”, they differed in the initial element “el”, the graphic stylisation of the earlier mark and the element “hart”, which constituted half of LEONHART.
• The visual similarity was therefore low, not average. The phonetic similarity was also low because the signs differed in rhythm and pronunciation: EL LEON would be pronounced “el-le-on”, while LEONHART would be pronounced “le-on-art”, as the letter “h” is silent in Spanish.
• Conceptually, EL LEON would clearly be understood by Spanish consumers as referring to a lion, whereas LEONHART could be perceived as a first name or surname rather than a direct reference to a lion. The signs were therefore conceptually different.
• The Court stressed that, despite identity or similarity of the goods and the normal distinctive character of the earlier mark, the visual, phonetic and conceptual differences between the signs excluded a likelihood of confusion.
• It also recalled that a conceptual difference may neutralise low visual and phonetic similarities where at least one of the signs has a clear and specific meaning for the relevant public.
• The General Court therefore annulled the Board of Appeal’s decision, upheld Instanta’s appeal and ordered EUIPO to pay the costs, including the costs before the Board of Appeal.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025TJ0461

 

T-476/25 Ionfarma / EUIPO – Vision Healthcare (Serosan)

• The case concerned opposition proceedings against the EU word mark Serosan.
• Vision Healthcare BV applied for Serosan for Class 5 goods including dietary supplements, vitamin preparations, sedatives, medicinal tonics, probiotics, dietary fibre, nutritional products and plant extracts for pharmaceutical purposes.
• Ionfarma, SL opposed the application on the basis of the earlier Spanish word mark CLENOSAN, registered for Class 3 goods, namely soaps and cosmetics. The opposition relied on Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001.
• At Vision Healthcare’s request, EUIPO invited Ionfarma to prove genuine use of the earlier mark. Ionfarma submitted evidence of use. The Opposition Division rejected the opposition.
• The Board of Appeal dismissed Ionfarma’s appeal. It held that there was no likelihood of confusion even assuming, in the applicant’s favour, that the goods were identical. Clear visual and phonetic differences at the beginnings of CLENOSAN and Serosan were not offset by the similarity in their endings.
• The relevant territory was Spain and the relevant public included both average consumers and professionals. The level of attention varied from average to high depending on the goods.
• The applicant argued that the signs were highly similar because of their similar length, orthographic configuration, identical sequence of vowels and common ending “osan”. It also argued that identity of the goods should lead to a finding of likelihood of confusion.
• The General Court dismissed the action. It held that the Board had correctly treated the signs as fanciful terms with no meaning for the relevant public, making conceptual comparison neutral or impossible.
• Visually, the mere similar number of letters and some letters in the same positions did not establish significant similarity. The difference between the initial elements “cl” and “s” was clear and immediately noticeable, while the difference between “n” and “r” in the middle reinforced the visual distinction.
• Phonetically, the signs coincided in only one of three syllables, the final syllable “san”. The preceding syllables “no” and “ro” differed, and the initial elements “clen” and “ser” created different phonetic impressions.
• The identical vowel pattern was insufficient to offset the important phonetic differences. CLENOSAN begins with the consonant cluster “cl”, pronounced strongly, while Serosan begins with a single “s” and has a softer sound; the “n”/“r” difference also affects rhythm and pronunciation.
• The Court agreed that the visual and phonetic similarity was below average and that the earlier mark CLENOSAN had an average distinctive character.
• The principle of interdependence does not mean that identical goods automatically result in a likelihood of confusion. Similarity of goods is only one element of the global assessment, and the conditions concerning similarity of signs and goods are cumulative.
• The Court also rejected the argument that Serosan could be seen as a variant, development or sub-line of products marketed under CLENOSAN. The shared ending “osan” was insufficient for consumers to perceive the goods as coming from the same or economically linked undertakings.
• The action was dismissed in its entirety.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025TJ0476

 

20/04 – 24/04

T-228/25 Crocs / EUIPO – Gor Factory (Footwear)

• The case concerned invalidity proceedings concerning Crocs, Inc.’s registered Community design representing footwear.
• The contested design was filed on 22 November 2004 for products in Class 02-04 of the Locarno Classification, namely footwear.
• Gor Factory, SA applied for a declaration of invalidity under Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation No 6/2002, in conjunction with Articles 4 and 6, arguing that the Crocs design lacked individual character in light of an earlier Holey Soles clog design.
• The Invalidity Division upheld the application. The Board of Appeal dismissed Crocs’ appeal, finding that the earlier design had been made available to the public on 13 and 14 April 2003, before the priority date of the contested design, 28 May 2004.
• The Board held that the products were footwear, in particular clogs, and that the informed user had a relatively high level of attention. It also found that the designer’s degree of freedom for clogs was high.
• Crocs argued that the designer’s freedom was at most average because clogs have basic construction features such as a rounded shape, an open heel and a relatively flat sole. It also argued that the Board had failed to give proper weight to the distinctive heel strap in the contested design.
• The General Court dismissed the action. It held that the need for certain product features does not by itself restrict design freedom where the designer can still vary the shape, size, arrangement and overall appearance of those features.
• The Court agreed that the designer’s freedom in designing clogs was high, including as regards material, colour, decorative elements, patterns, and the number, size, shape and arrangement of holes and openings.
• As regards the overall impression, both designs showed a clog of essentially the same shape, with a thick sole and rounded closed toe. They also coincided in the arrangement of circular holes on the upper and trapezoidal openings at the front and sides.
• The difference consisting in the heel strap on the contested design was not sufficient to create a different overall impression on the informed user. The strap would be noticed, but it was less important than the essentially identical shape of the two designs.
• The informed user could regard the contested design as an alternative version of the earlier design and the heel strap as a minor modification of the same type of clog.
• The Court also held that the design process, reputation, commercial success or iconic status of the product were not decisive for the assessment of individual character, which must be based on the overall impression produced by the designs on the informed user.
• The General Court therefore held that the Crocs design lacked individual character in relation to the earlier Holey Soles design and dismissed the action in its entirety.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025TJ0228

 

T-349/25 Barranco Rodriguez and Barranco Schnitzler / EUIPO – Snowacki and Others (G MOTION)

• The case concerned invalidity proceedings against the EU figurative mark G MOTION, registered for Class 7 goods such as transmission parts, machine gear components, electric drives, electric motors, brakes, gearboxes, reducers, servomotors, couplings and drive shafts for machines.
• Mariano Barranco Rodriguez and Pablo Barranco Schnitzler sought invalidity on the basis of the earlier EU figurative mark GM Germany Motions, registered for Class 7 goods including bed motors, electric motors, drive units for machines, electrical motor controllers, spindle shafts, couplings and transmission components.
• The application was based on Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001 in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b), and on Article 8(5). The Cancellation Division and the Board of Appeal rejected the application.
• The General Court held that the relevant public consisted of professionals in the European Union with a high level of attention. It assumed, in the applicants’ favour, that the goods were identical.
• For the contested sign, the Board found that it consisted of a red letter “g” and the word “motion” written vertically in much smaller letters. “Motion” would be perceived by professional consumers as descriptive and devoid of distinctive character for machines, engines and motors. The letter “g”, although weakly distinctive, was the most distinctive and dominant element because of its size, position and gear-wheel stylisation.
• For the earlier mark, the Board found that it consisted of the letters “g” and “m” and the expression “Germany motions”. That expression would be understood as referring to motors from Germany and therefore had weak distinctive character. The letters “g” and “m” would be perceived as an abbreviation of “Germany motions”. No element dominated the earlier mark; its distinctive character lay in the specific arrangement and stylisation of its elements.
• The Court endorsed those findings. A single letter generally has weak distinctive character and the gear-wheel stylisation also alluded to the goods.
• The signs were visually similar only to a low degree. They differed in layout, colours, composition and stylisation: the contested sign had a dominant stylised “g” and the vertically placed word “motion”, whereas the earlier sign contained “g” and “m”, “Germany motions”, two colours and a different graphic arrangement.
• Phonetic similarity was average. Part of the public might pronounce the earlier mark as “GM Germany motions”, while part might pronounce it as “Germany motions” if it perceived “gm” as an abbreviation.
• Conceptual similarity was low. Both signs referred to the idea of motion, but that concept was weakly distinctive for the goods concerned, and the element “Germany” introduced a conceptual difference.
• The earlier mark had weak inherent distinctive character. The applicants had not shown enhanced distinctive character or reputation; declarations, internet search results, trade-fair materials, leaflets and brochures did not prove that the earlier mark was known by a significant part of the relevant public.
• Accordingly, despite the assumed identity of the goods, there was no likelihood of confusion. The decisive factors were the low visual and conceptual similarity, the weak distinctive character of the earlier mark, the descriptive or allusive character of the common elements and the high level of attention of professional consumers.
• The plea based on Article 8(5) was also rejected because reputation had not been proved. The action was dismissed and each party bore its own costs.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025TJ0349

 

T-494/24 Peponis / EUIPO – Palamianakis (CRETE HOMES REAL ESTATE CRETE PROPERTY and CONSTRUCTION CONSULTANTS SINCE 1990)

 

• The case concerned invalidity proceedings concerning the EU trade mark CRETE HOMES REAL ESTATE CRETE PROPERTY and CONSTRUCTION CONSULTANTS SINCE 1990, registered on 2 July 2008 jointly in the names of Emmanouil Peponis and Fanourios Palamianakis.
• The mark was registered for services in Classes 36 and 37, namely real estate affairs and building, repair and installation services.
• Peponis sought a declaration of invalidity and transfer of the mark to himself, relying on Article 60(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 in conjunction with Article 8(3). He claimed that Palamianakis was his representative and that the mark had been applied for also in Palamianakis’ name without his consent.
• The Cancellation Division and the Board of Appeal rejected the application. The Board found that the circumstances showed that Peponis had consented to the filing of the mark in the name of both parties.
• The Court noted that Regulation No 40/94, not Regulation 2017/1001, applied because the application was filed on 6 October 2007. It recalled that Article 8(3) prevents misappropriation of a mark by an agent or representative of the proprietor.
• Four cumulative conditions must be satisfied: the proprietor of the earlier mark must request refusal or invalidity; the applicant must be the proprietor’s agent or representative; the filing must be made without the proprietor’s consent and without justification; and the filing must concern essentially identical or similar signs and goods or services.
• The key condition in the case was absence of consent. Consent to filing by an agent or representative must be clear, specific and unconditional.
• It was undisputed that Peponis had used the trade name CRETE HOMES since 1992, that Palamianakis began working for him in 2000 and was appointed representative and attorney in 2007 with the right to use the trade name CRETE HOMES, that Peponis registered a Greek mark in his own name, and that the contested EU mark was filed on 6 October 2007 in both parties’ names.
• The decisive document was the general authorisation signed by both parties and filed with EUIPO on 2 November 2007 by their common representative. It authorised representation of both parties before EUIPO and was filed less than one month after the contested application.
• The authorisation clearly identified both parties as applicants for the mark, meaning that both were to become co-proprietors. The fact that the earlier Greek mark was registered solely in Peponis’ name did not undermine his consent to filing the EU mark also in Palamianakis’ name.
• The Court rejected the argument that the authorisation was too general because it referred to “all” proceedings. It had been filed in the specific proceedings concerning the contested mark and no evidence showed that it related to another proceeding.
• The Court also rejected the allegation that Palamianakis had concealed the joint registration. There was no evidence of concealment or that Peponis could not have known that Palamianakis appeared on the registration certificate or renewal documents.
• The Court held that the Board had correctly found clear, specific and unconditional consent and dismissed the remaining pleas, including insufficient reasoning, failure to examine the circumstances, and breach of legal certainty and good administration.
• The action was dismissed in its entirety and Peponis was ordered to pay his own costs and those of EUIPO and Palamianakis.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62024TJ0494

 

27/04 – 03/05

Judgments T-122/25, T-123/25 and T-124/25 Wazdan Innovations / EUIPO (1 Coin, 3 Coins, 5 Coins)

 

• The cases concerned applications for the word marks “1 Coin”, “3 Coins” and “5 Coins” for goods and services relating to gaming, online gambling, game software, electronic games, casino services, marketing services, online game design and software as a service.
• The EUIPO examiner partially refused registration under Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation 2017/1001, finding that the signs lacked distinctive character and were descriptive.
• During the EUIPO proceedings the applicant restricted the list of goods and services. The Board of Appeal accepted the restriction but dismissed the appeal for most of the goods and services, finding the signs devoid of distinctive character, save for some online game design services in Class 42.
• The applicant argued that the Board had treated the signs as “quasi-descriptive” and had in practice applied the criteria for descriptiveness under Article 7(1)(c), even though the refusal was based on lack of distinctiveness under Article 7(1)(b).
• The General Court rejected that argument. A sign may lack distinctive character even if it is not descriptive. The Board had correctly examined whether the signs would be perceived as an indication of commercial origin or instead as information about the nature or functioning of the goods and services.
• Distinctive character must be assessed by reference to the goods and services applied for and from the perspective of the relevant public. The relevant public consisted mainly of average consumers interested in gaming and gambling, and partly of professionals for Classes 9 and 42.
• The Board found that “coin” means a coin and that, in the world of games, slot machines and gambling, coins are a customary element used to start a game, play a round or obtain a reward, including virtual coins or cryptocurrencies used in games.
• The Court held that “1 Coin”, and by the same reasoning “3 Coins” and “5 Coins”, would be perceived as information about the functioning, rules or aim of a game rather than as an indication of commercial origin.
• The combination of a numeral with “coin” could also be understood as an invitation to take part in a game that can be started with a certain number of coins. The numeral may suggest easy access or a low cost of participation.
• The refusal was not based solely on the promotional character of the signs. What mattered was that the signs would be understood as information about games or rules for using them, not as trade marks.
• The applicant’s reliance on earlier EUIPO decisions concerning signs containing “coins” was rejected. Registrability is assessed under Regulation 2017/1001 and EU case-law, and EUIPO is not bound by its earlier practice. The earlier registrations also concerned different signs with additional word elements.
• The Court concluded that the signs do not enable the relevant public to distinguish the applicant’s goods and services from those of other undertakings and are therefore devoid of distinctive character within the meaning of Article 7(1)(b). The actions were dismissed.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025TJ0122

 

Additional case details:

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025TJ0122

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025TJ0123

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025TJ0124

T-403/25 Groupvet / EUIPO – alfavet Tierarzneimittel (ALFAVET)

 

• The case concerned opposition proceedings against the EU figurative mark ALFAVET.
• Groupvet EE applied for the mark for goods and services in Classes 3, 10, 18, 21, 31 and 44, including cosmetics and care products for animals, veterinary tools, pet accessories, animal feed, veterinary services and grooming services.
• Loretta Philipp, the legal predecessor of alfavet Tierarzneimittel GmbH, opposed the application on the basis of an earlier EU figurative mark alfavet registered for Classes 3, 5 and 31, including cosmetics, veterinary preparations, supplements for animals, disinfectants, insecticides and animal feed.
• The opposition was based on Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. The Opposition Division partially upheld the opposition. The Board of Appeal partly upheld Groupvet’s appeal but maintained refusal for Classes 3, 31 and 44 and some Class 10 goods.
• Groupvet challenged the decision, alleging an incorrect assessment of likelihood of confusion, bad faith of the intervener and lack of standing of Loretta Philipp.
• The General Court rejected the standing plea. At the time the opposition was filed, Loretta Philipp owned the earlier mark and was therefore entitled to oppose. It was irrelevant whether the mark was in fact used solely by the later intervener.
• The Court also rejected the bad-faith plea. In opposition proceedings EUIPO does not examine the validity of the earlier mark or whether it was filed in bad faith; such arguments belong in invalidity proceedings against the earlier mark.
• The relevant public consisted both of the general public, in particular pet owners, and professionals such as breeders and veterinarians. The level of attention could be average for Classes 3 and 31 and high for Classes 5, 10 and 44.
• The likelihood of confusion had to be assessed throughout the European Union because the earlier mark was an EU trade mark, irrespective of any allegation that it was used only in Germany.
• Both signs contained the same word element alfavet / ALFAVET. Although it may be broken down into “alfa” and “vet”, as a whole it is a fanciful term without a concrete meaning and would be perceived as a name.
• The Court held that the element alfavet had normal distinctive character, at least for part of the relevant public. The graphic differences were not decisive: the black ALFAVET lettering and red triangles in the applied-for sign, and the grey slightly italicised alfavet lettering with a blue square in the earlier sign, were decorative and secondary to the identical word element.
• The signs were highly visually similar and phonetically and conceptually identical. In the global assessment, the identity or varying degrees of similarity of the goods and services, combined with the identical word element and limited graphic differences, created a likelihood of confusion.
• Even if some consumers noticed the small differences, they could perceive ALFAVET as indicating the same or an economically linked commercial origin for identical or similar goods and services. The action was dismissed in its entirety.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025TJ0403

 

T-465/25 and T-466/25 Fisher Investments Europe / EUIPO (FI)

 

• The case concerned applications for figurative marks containing the word element “FI” for services in Classes 36 and 41, including investment management, investment advisory services, seminars, personal appearances and lectures in the field of investment management and advisory services.
• The EUIPO examiner refused registration under Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation 2017/1001, finding the signs descriptive and devoid of distinctive character. The Board of Appeal dismissed the appeals.
• The Board held that the relevant public could perceive the signs as descriptive because they could indicate services relating to investments in Finland, management of a securities portfolio on the Finnish stock exchange, or services provided by a financial institution.
• The General Court joined Cases T-465/25 and T-466/25 for the judgment. It first rejected the request that the Court itself order registration, since neither the Board of Appeal nor the Court formally registers EU trade marks.
• On the merits, the Court examined whether the signs were descriptive under Article 7(1)(c). A sign is descriptive where there is a sufficiently direct and specific link with the services enabling the relevant public immediately and without further thought to perceive a description of those services or one of their characteristics.
• The relevant public for Class 36 services consisted of both the general public and specialised consumers. Class 41 services were directed solely at professional or specialised consumers. Their level of attention was high.
• The applicant argued that the graphic elements made FI secondary and that the signs did not contain a term that, in ordinary language, designated the services. It also argued that consumers would not immediately perceive the signs as referring to Finland or to a financial institution.
• The Court rejected those arguments. The applicant did not dispute that the letters f and i form the abbreviation FI, which may mean “financial institution” and may also serve as Finland’s country code.
• The Court held that EUIPO could rely on evidence showing that FI is used as an abbreviation for financial institution. At least a non-negligible part of the English-speaking public could immediately understand FI in that sense.
• The concept of a financial institution has a sufficiently direct and specific link with the services, since investment, advisory and educational services in the investment field may be provided by a financial institution. It was therefore unnecessary to decide whether the signs were also descriptive as a reference to Finland.
• The graphic elements did not confer distinctive character. The font was relatively standard, the dark blue circular or square background was not original or exceptional, and the underline merely emphasised the FI element.
• Because one absolute ground for refusal is sufficient, the Court did not need to examine separately whether the signs were also devoid of distinctive character under Article 7(1)(b). The actions were dismissed.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025TJ0465

 

T-574/24 Romagnoli Fratelli / CPVO (Melrose)

• The case concerned the Community plant variety right for the potato variety Melrose.
• Community protection was granted on 20 February 2012 by a CPVO decision, and the applicant became the holder of the Community plant variety right on 28 April 2018.
• On 27 October 2021 CPVO issued the annual fee note for protection of the variety and sent it to the applicant via the MyPVR user account. Because the fee was not paid on time, CPVO sent a formal reminder on 10 January 2022 requiring payment within one month, failing which the right would be cancelled.
• The fee was not paid within the deadline, and on 21 March 2022 CPVO issued a decision cancelling Romagnoli Fratelli’s Community plant variety right for Melrose.
• On 6 May 2022 the applicant applied for restitutio in integrum in respect of the time limit for paying the annual fee and paid the outstanding amount. CPVO rejected that application on 7 November 2022. The action against that decision was dismissed by the General Court on 17 April 2024 in Case T-2/23, and the appeal was dismissed by the Court of Justice on 1 August 2025.
• In parallel, on 6 January 2023 the applicant appealed to the CPVO Board of Appeal against the cancellation decision of 21 March 2022 and also sought restitutio in integrum for the missed appeal deadline.
• The Board of Appeal found that the appeal against the cancellation decision was late. The decision was deemed notified on 30 March 2022, the appeal deadline expired on 30 May 2022, and the appeal was filed more than seven months later. The Board also considered that it had jurisdiction over the application for restitutio in integrum concerning a time limit before it.
• The General Court agreed. Since the missed time limit concerned an act before the CPVO Board of Appeal, that Board was competent to hear the application for restitutio in integrum.
• On the merits, the applicant relied on special circumstances connected with COVID-19, including staff absences for medical reasons, the absence of the employee responsible for CPVO correspondence, and organisational and financial difficulties of a medium-sized agricultural undertaking.
• The Court recalled that restitutio in integrum requires two cumulative conditions: the party must have exercised all due care required by the particular circumstances, and failure to observe the time limit must directly cause the loss of a right or remedy. Those conditions are interpreted strictly because time limits serve legal certainty.
• The applicant had not proved special circumstances justifying failure to appeal in time. In particular, it had not shown staff absences for medical reasons during the period from 30 March to 30 May 2022, when the appeal deadline was running.
• As regards the employee responsible for CPVO correspondence, the evidence indicated absence in January 2022 rather than from March to May 2022. The applicant also failed to show that she could not be replaced or why her duties and access credentials for MyPVR were not transferred to another employee.
• The Court rejected the argument concerning a cyberattack on a partner company, since the applicant had not shown how a cyberattack in late December 2021 could justify missing a deadline several months later, especially as the cancellation decision was received on 30 March 2022.
• The Court also rejected the argument that CPVO had not sufficiently informed the applicant of available remedies. The decision of 21 March 2022 mentioned the possibility of appeal within two months, and the correspondence of 5 May 2022 informed the applicant of possible legal remedies and their conditions.
• The applicant’s status as a medium-sized undertaking and its possible staffing or financial difficulties did not suffice to establish force majeure or special circumstances. A staff shortage in a medium-sized agricultural undertaking cannot automatically be treated as force majeure.
• The Court further rejected the challenge to service. MyPVR is a valid official method for service of CPVO decisions, communications and information where the user has chosen electronic communication. The applicant had accepted electronic communication through MyPVR and its terms of use.
• The reminder of 10 January 2022 was therefore validly served through MyPVR. Since an automatic email notice was sent on 11 January 2022, the reminder was deemed served on 18 January 2022. The applicant had not informed CPVO of any problem accessing documents in MyPVR.
• The General Court concluded that CPVO had correctly found that the applicant had not shown special circumstances or due care. The action was dismissed in its entirety and Romagnoli Fratelli SpA was ordered to pay the costs.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62024TJ0573

 

04/05 – 10/05

T-578/25 Doors Bulgaria / EUIPO – Top Ten (Doors)

• The case concerned invalidity proceedings relating to a registered EU design representing a door.
• Top Ten EOOD applied for a declaration of invalidity of a design owned by Doors Bulgaria EOOD and registered for products in Locarno Class 25.02, namely doors.
• The application relied on Article 25(1)(b) of Regulation No 6/2002 in conjunction with Articles 4(1), 5(1)(b) and 6(1)(b). Top Ten argued that the contested design was not new and lacked individual character.
• The earlier design was a representation of a door in a promotional brochure of Vesta Logistics EOOD, with an offer valid from 3 May 2010 to 5 June 2010.
• The Invalidity Division invalidated the contested design for lack of individual character. The Board of Appeal dismissed Doors Bulgaria’s appeal, finding that the brochure was sufficient to prove that the earlier design had been made available to the public before the filing date of the contested design and that the designs produced the same overall impression on the informed user.
• Doors Bulgaria argued that the brochure had no reliable date and could have been easily created or altered for the invalidity proceedings.
• The General Court first declared inadmissible an annex to the application consisting of a modified version of the brochure in which the applicant had changed dates and image positions using Paint. Since that document had not been before the Board of Appeal, it could not be considered for the first time before the Court.
• The Court recalled that an earlier design is deemed to have been made available to the public if it has been published, exhibited, used in trade or otherwise disclosed before the filing date of the contested design. Disclosure must be proved by solid and objective evidence, not assumptions.
• Regulation No 6/2002 does not prescribe a closed list of evidence capable of proving prior disclosure. An applicant for invalidity may submit any useful evidence and EUIPO must assess whether it actually proves disclosure.
• The Court held that the Vesta Logistics brochure was sufficient evidence. It contained the earlier door design, product identification, price, discount information, details of the company offering the product and the offer period from 3 May to 5 June 2010.
• The brochure came from a third party to Top Ten, which supported the conclusion that it had been publicly distributed. A promotional offer valid during a defined period must, by its nature, have been disseminated before or during that period.
• The Court noted that the exact date of disclosure need not always be known; it is sufficient to establish with reasonable certainty that disclosure occurred before the filing date of the contested design.
• The possibility that a document could abstractly be altered is not enough to undermine its probative value. Concrete indications of manipulation, such as contradictions, traces of forgery or inconsistencies, would be required. The applicant’s allegations were speculative.
• Once disclosure was established, the party disputing it had to prove that the circumstances could reasonably have prevented the disclosure from becoming known in the normal course of business to the circles specialised in the sector operating in the European Union. Doors Bulgaria produced no such evidence.
• The General Court therefore confirmed that the earlier design had been made available to the public and dismissed the action in its entirety.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025TJ0578

 

T-291/25 Ecuphar / EUIPO – Société des produits Nestlé (proGlan)

• The case concerned opposition proceedings against Ecuphar’s EU figurative mark proGlan.
• On 11 February 2022 Ecuphar applied for proGlan for Class 5 goods, namely medicines supporting the function of anal glands for veterinary use.
• On 7 June 2022 Société des produits Nestlé SA opposed registration on the basis of the earlier EU word mark PRO PLAN, covering Class 5 goods including nutritional supplements for veterinary use and nutritional supplements for animal consumption.
• The opposition was based on Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. The Opposition Division upheld the opposition and rejected the application. The Board of Appeal dismissed Ecuphar’s appeal.
• Ecuphar argued before the General Court that proGlan and PRO PLAN were sufficiently different to exclude a likelihood of confusion. It also requested that the applied-for mark be allowed to proceed to registration.
• The Court rejected the request for registration for lack of jurisdiction and also rejected the request to annul the Opposition Division’s decision, since an action before the Court may concern only the Board of Appeal’s decision.
• The relevant public included both the general public, such as pet owners, and professionals, in particular veterinarians. The level of attention was enhanced because the goods may affect animal health and welfare.
• The Court held that medicines supporting anal-gland function for veterinary use were similar to an average degree to nutritional supplements for veterinary use.
• The stylisation of proGlan, including colours, typeface and the graphic representation of the letter “o”, did not dominate the word element. Those graphic elements were decorative and secondary.
• Average consumers refer to goods more readily by the name of the mark than by describing its graphic elements. The signs were visually similar to an average degree, phonetically similar to a high degree and conceptually similar to a low degree.
• The similarities did not rest solely on the weakly distinctive element “pro”; they also resulted from the similarity between “glan” and “plan”. The differences were insufficient to exclude a likelihood of confusion.
• The Court rejected the argument based on a New Zealand intellectual property office decision because the EU trade mark system is autonomous and decisions of third-country authorities do not bind EUIPO or the Court.
• The Court concluded that the Board of Appeal had not erred in finding a likelihood of confusion and dismissed the action in its entirety.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025TJ0291

 

T-480/25 Pharma Green Holding v EUIPO – Alma Lasers (alma FARMACIE)

• The case concerned opposition proceedings against Pharma Green Holding SpA SB’s EU figurative mark alma FARMACIE.
• On 21 June 2022 Pharma Green Holding applied for alma FARMACIE for Classes 3, 5 and 44, including cosmetics, pharmaceutical preparations, dietary supplements and medical and pharmaceutical services.
• On 19 September 2022 Alma Lasers Ltd opposed registration on the basis of the earlier EU word mark ALMA HYBRID, covering Classes 10 and 44, including lasers for medical purposes, ultrasound apparatus, medical services and hygiene and beauty care services for human beings.
• The opposition was based on Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001. The Opposition Division upheld the opposition for all contested goods and services. The Board of Appeal dismissed Pharma Green Holding’s appeal, finding a likelihood of confusion for the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking public in the Union.
• The applicant sought annulment of the decision and registration of the applied-for mark, at least for certain pharmaceutical services in Class 44. The Court rejected the requests concerning registration because neither the Board nor the Court has jurisdiction formally to order registration of an EU trade mark.
• The Court recalled that refusal of an EU trade mark is justified where likelihood of confusion exists in only part of the European Union. The Board could therefore base its assessment on the perception of Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking consumers.
• Class 3 goods such as cosmetics, perfumes and care preparations were similar to an average degree to hygiene and beauty care services, since they share the purpose of caring for, cleaning, protecting or improving the appearance of the body. Such goods may also be used in beauty services and sold by beauty salons or spas.
• Class 5 goods, including pharmaceutical preparations and dietary supplements, were similar to medical services in Class 44, because they may be connected with medical services, share a health-related purpose and be complementary to them.
• Class 44 services covered by the applied-for mark, including medical and pharmaceutical services, were identical to medical services covered by the earlier mark or fell within their broader category.
• The Court rejected reliance on the actual business profiles of the parties. In opposition proceedings, EUIPO compares the lists of goods and services, not the parties’ actual commercial activities.
• The Court agreed that “alma” was the most distinctive element of both signs. “Farmacie” would be understood as referring to a pharmacy and was devoid of distinctive character for pharmaceutical, medical and cosmetic goods and services. “Hybrid” would be understood as hybrid and had weak distinctive character because it could suggest two methods or technologies.
• The Court corrected one point in the Board’s assessment: in the word mark ALMA HYBRID the element “alma” was not dominant, although it was distinctive. That error did not affect the outcome.
• The signs were visually similar to an above-average degree. Differences resulting from “FARMACIE”, “HYBRID” and the graphic form of the applied-for mark were insufficient to remove similarity.
• Phonetically, the signs were at least similar to an above-average degree because the common element “alma” appeared at the beginning of both signs and might be the only element pronounced by part of the public, especially given the weaker distinctive character of “farmacie” and “hybrid”.
• Conceptually, the signs were not identical, as the Board had held, but highly similar because of the shared meaning of “alma”; the differences resulting from “farmacie” and “hybrid” had limited significance.
• The earlier mark ALMA HYBRID had average inherent distinctive character. A higher level of attention of part of the public did not exclude likelihood of confusion, because even attentive consumers rarely compare marks side by side and usually rely on an imperfect recollection.
• The Court rejected the argument that the parties operated in different market sectors and the argument based on an alleged obligation to identify pharmacies in Italy with a green cross. The assessment concerns the applied-for and earlier marks as registered or applied for, not additional signs used in practice.
• The Court therefore upheld the finding of likelihood of confusion and dismissed the action in its entirety.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025TJ0480

 

C-496/24 Stichting de Thuiskopie

• The case concerned a request for a preliminary ruling on Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29/EC, read in conjunction with Article 5(5), and whether offline copies available in paid streaming services constitute private copies.
• The dispute arose in the Netherlands in relation to the private copying levy charged to manufacturers of IT equipment, including HP and Dell. Stichting de Thuiskopie and Stichting Onderhandelingen Thuiskopievergoeding sought to include in that levy offline copies made within music and film streaming services.
• The situation concerned a user of a paid streaming platform who may download a work to a device for offline use. The copy is not freely available to the user: it is stored in a part of the device memory controlled by the service provider, protected technically and playable only within the streaming application.
• The user cannot transfer the copy to another medium, copy it, or use it outside the service. After termination of the subscription, expiry of a set period or withdrawal of consent by the rightholder, access to the copy may be blocked or the copy removed.
• The referring Dutch court asked whether such an offline copy falls within the private copying exception in Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29.
• The Court of Justice first considered whether making available an offline-use copy of a protected work constitutes reproduction within Article 2 or falls under the rights in Article 3, in particular the right of communication to the public.
• The Court stated that the private copying exception concerns only the reproduction right, not the right of communication to the public.
• Making a work available by a streaming platform in the form of an offline copy may amount to communication to the public, because the user may access the work at a place and time of his or her choosing and the feature is available to all subscribers of the service. The final classification is for the national court.
• If the national court were to classify the act as reproduction, the conditions of the private copying exception would still have to be examined.
• The Court held that, in the described model, the user does not independently make a copy within the meaning of the private copying exception. The copy is made through the streaming service provider, which retains technical control over it. The user does not possess the source of the copy and cannot freely dispose of it.
• It was also material that the rightholder retains control over the work through technological measures, deciding which works are available offline and being able to block access to the copy.
• In those circumstances, the typical harm associated with private copying does not arise, because the copy remains under the control and authorisation of the rightholder.
• Accordingly, an offline copy within a streaming service that the user cannot technically transfer or use outside the service does not fall within the private copying exception.
• The Court also addressed remuneration under a licence between the streaming platform and the rightholder. Payment for making or using offline copies is not in itself decisive for application of the private copying exception.
• The decisive issue is whether the rightholder retained control over the work by technological measures. Where that control exists, the offline copy falls within the scope of the authorisation granted to the platform, not within the private copying exception.
• The ruling is important for private copying levy systems because it confirms that not every technical copy stored on a user’s device is a private copy requiring fair compensation.

The Court ruled as follows:

1. Article 5(2)(b) of Directive 2001/29/EC must be interpreted as meaning that the making available of a protected work by a streaming service provider by means of an offline-use copy on an end user’s device, at that user’s request, where the user has no technical possibility of disposing of the work outside that service and the rightholder retains control over that work, including the ability to block access to that copy, does not fall within the private copying exception. Article 5(2)(b) must also be interpreted as meaning that application of that exception is not affected by the fact that the making or use of an offline copy has been remunerated under a licence, where the rightholder has not implemented technological measures and therefore could not consent to that act.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62024CJ0496

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C-132/25 M.M. Ristorazione

• The case concerned the interpretation of Article 9(5) of Directive 2004/48/EC of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights.
• Villa Ramazzini owned the figurative trade mark Mò Mò, while M.M. Ristorazione used the sign “Mò Mò Pizza, Sapori e Salute”.
• On 22 March 2018 a court in Rome ordered a provisional measure prohibiting M.M. Ristorazione from using that sign and other signs containing Mò Mò. It also ordered removal of the sign from M.M. Ristorazione’s shop front and imposed a penalty payment for each day of delay in compliance.
• M. Ristorazione later sought a declaration that the provisional measure had ceased to have effect. It argued that Villa Ramazzini had not initiated proceedings on the merits within the prescribed time limit and that the measure therefore had to be revoked under Article 9(5) of Directive 2004/48.
• The lower Italian courts rejected that request. They considered that Italian law allowed certain provisional measures to remain in force where they anticipated the effects of a judgment on the merits. In their view, Article 9 concerned only measures that were provisional by nature, not measures capable of anticipating the effects of the judgment on the merits.
• The question was therefore whether such a measure may remain in force even though the party that obtained it did not subsequently initiate proceedings on the merits.
• The Corte suprema di cassazione referred the question to the Court of Justice.
• The Court held that Article 9(5) covers a broad category of provisional measures, including interim injunctions intended to prevent further infringements of intellectual property rights.
• Article 9(5) does not exclude provisional measures that may anticipate the effects of a decision on the merits. The purpose of the provision is to protect the defendant from a situation in which a provisional measure remains in force without review by the court dealing with the merits.
• Where the applicant fails to initiate proceedings on the merits within the deadline, the defendant must be able to seek revocation of the provisional measure or a declaration that it has otherwise ceased to have effect.
• The Court noted that Article 9(5) does not provide for automatic lapse of provisional measures. It is nevertheless necessary that the defendant be able to make such a request.
• The Court rejected the argument based on procedural economy. Procedural economy cannot prevail over the express safeguards provided by EU law, including the rights of defence.
• The Court also emphasised that national rules more favourable to rightholders cannot upset the balance between protection of intellectual property rights and the rights of the defendant.
• The ruling means that an interim measure in intellectual property matters cannot permanently replace proceedings on the merits where the defendant seeks its revocation.

The Court ruled as follows:

2. Article 9(5) of Directive 2004/48/EC precludes a national provision that allows certain provisional measures, including measures capable of anticipating the effects of a decision on the merits, to remain in force where the applicant has not initiated proceedings leading to such a decision within the period laid down in Article 9(5), and the defendant requests that those measures be revoked or otherwise cease to have effect.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025CJ0132

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C-127/24 Seniorenresidenz

• The case concerned a request for a preliminary ruling on Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC and the concept of communication to the public.
• GEMA, the German collecting society, brought proceedings against VHC 2, the operator of a retirement home.
• VHC 2 received television and radio programmes through its own satellite reception system and then retransmitted those programmes simultaneously, unaltered and in full through an internal cable network to sockets in residents’ rooms and healthcare rooms.
• GEMA argued that the retransmission required a licence because it constituted communication to the public of works in its repertoire.
• The court of first instance upheld GEMA’s claim, but the appellate court dismissed it. It held that the retransmission was not directed to the public but to a limited and relatively stable group of residents. The residents formed a private, defined group rather than a public within copyright law.
• The referring court asked whether retransmission of a satellite signal through the internal cable network of a retirement home constitutes communication to the public.
• The Court recalled that communication to the public involves two elements: an act of communication of a work and communication of that work to a public.
• The Court also stated that communication to the public may exist where the work is transmitted by a specific technical means or is directed to a new public. A “new public” is a public not taken into account by the rightholder when authorising the original broadcast.
• The Court held that the retransmission by VHC 2 was not a retransmission by a specific technical means in the relevant sense. It resembled distribution of a signal inside a building rather than an independent internet retransmission.
• The Court therefore examined whether the residents were a new public.
• Residents of a retirement home live there permanently and use their rooms as private spaces. Their position is closer to that of tenants than to hotel guests, restaurant customers or patients in a rehabilitation centre.
• The residents therefore do not constitute a new public. They are recipients whom rightholders could have taken into account when authorising the original radio and television broadcasts.
• The commercial nature of the retirement home’s activity is not decisive in itself. It may be relevant in the assessment but does not automatically establish communication to the public.
• The Court also observed that treating such retransmission as communication to the public could lead to an additional and unwarranted remuneration for rightholders.
• The Court ultimately held that Article 3(1) does not cover this type of retransmission. Retransmission of television and radio programmes through the internal cable network of a retirement home to residents’ rooms does not require separate authorisation under that provision.

The Court ruled as follows:

3. Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of “communication to the public” does not cover the simultaneous, unaltered and complete retransmission by an operator of a retirement home of broadcast programmes received via a satellite reception system to television and radio sockets in residents’ rooms through a cable network installed in that retirement home.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62024CJ0127

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C-797/23 Meta Platforms Ireland (Fair compensation)

• The case concerned a request for a preliminary ruling on Article 15 of Directive 2019/790 on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market, and on Article 109 TFEU and Articles 16 and 52 of the Charter.
• Italian legislation granted press publishers a right to fair remuneration for online use of their press publications by information society service providers.
• AGCOM adopted a decision setting criteria for determining that remuneration, including calculation by reference to the provider’s advertising revenues linked to the use of press publications.
• Meta challenged the AGCOM decision before the Italian administrative court. It argued that Article 15 of Directive 2019/790 grants press publishers exclusive rights, not a separate right to remuneration.
• Meta also challenged obligations imposed on information society service providers, including the duty to enter into negotiations with publishers, to provide information necessary to determine remuneration and not to restrict the visibility of publishers’ content in search results during negotiations.
• Meta further argued that AGCOM’s powers infringed freedom to conduct a business, because AGCOM could set criteria for remuneration, determine the amount in the absence of agreement and impose sanctions for breach of information obligations.
• The referring Italian court asked whether such national rules were compatible with Article 15 of Directive 2019/790 and Articles 16 and 52 of the Charter.
• The Court recalled that Article 15 grants press publishers related rights, including the right to authorise reproduction and making available to the public of press publications online by information society service providers. Those rights are exclusive and preventive.
• As a rule, a service provider therefore needs prior authorisation from the publisher to use a press publication online.
• Member States may not replace that exclusive right with a mere right to compensation. Publishers must retain the possibility of refusing authorisation and of granting authorisation free of charge.
• However, Article 15 does not preclude national law from providing for fair remuneration as consideration for authorisation, provided that the remuneration is linked to actual use or intended use of press publications. A provider may not be required to pay where it does not use and does not intend to use such publications.
• The Court also held that Member States may regulate the exercise of Article 15 rights and impose obligations designed to ensure effective and fair negotiations between publishers and providers. An obligation to provide information needed to determine remuneration may be compatible with EU law.
• Service providers often possess information unavailable to publishers, such as data on the economic value of the use of publications. Without that information publishers’ bargaining position would be weaker.
• The prohibition on reducing the visibility of publishers’ content during negotiations may also be permissible, as it prevents pressure on publishers and concealment of the economic value of use.
• The Court accepted that a public authority such as AGCOM may be empowered to set reference criteria for remuneration and determine the amount in the absence of agreement, provided that the parties retain the freedom not to conclude a contract.
• AGCOM may also monitor compliance with information obligations and impose sanctions, provided that those obligations and sanctions are proportionate.
• In relation to Article 16 of the Charter, the Court held that the information duties, visibility rule and AGCOM’s powers may restrict freedom to conduct a business, but those restrictions may be justified by protection of intellectual property and by freedom and pluralism of the media.
• The Court emphasised the importance of a free and pluralistic press in a democratic society and the organisational and financial contribution of press publishers to press publications.
• Member States may therefore adopt mechanisms strengthening publishers’ negotiating position vis-à-vis large digital service providers, but they may not convert Article 15 exclusive rights into a compulsory payment obligation detached from actual use.

The Court ruled as follows:

4. Article 15 of Directive 2019/790 and Articles 16 and 52 of the Charter must be interpreted as not precluding national rules which provide that press publishers are entitled to receive fair remuneration in return for authorising information society service providers to use their publications; require providers using or intending to use such publications to negotiate with publishers, not to restrict visibility of publishers’ content in search results during negotiations and to provide information needed to determine the remuneration; and empower a public authority to set reference criteria, determine remuneration in the absence of agreement, monitor compliance with information obligations and impose administrative fines, provided that publishers remain free to refuse authorisation or grant it free of charge, providers are not required to pay where there is no use of publications, and obligations and penalties are proportionate.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62023CJ0797