1.    Judgment T-24/25 Les Editions Albert Rene / EUIPO – Works 11 Michal Lubinski (Obelix)

• The case concerned invalidity proceedings against the EU word mark Obelix, registered by WORKS 11 MICHAL LUBINSKI for goods in Class 13, including firearms, weapons, projectiles, grenades, artillery guns, military rifles, ammunition, pepper sprays and component parts for weapons.
• The application for a declaration of invalidity was filed by Les Editions Albert Rene and was based on the earlier EU word mark OBELIX, registered for goods and services in Classes 9, 16, 25, 28 and 41, including printed matter, books, games, playthings, clothing, entertainment services and film production services.
• The application was based on Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) and Article 8(5) of that regulation. The applicant argued, in particular, that the earlier mark OBELIX had a reputation in the European Union and that use of the contested mark for weapons could be detrimental to the repute of the earlier mark.
• The Cancellation Division rejected the application in its entirety, finding that the evidence submitted was insufficient to prove genuine use of the earlier mark.
• The Board of Appeal dismissed the appeal. For reasons of procedural economy, it assumed that genuine use of the earlier mark had been established, but found that there was no likelihood of confusion because the goods and services at issue were dissimilar. It also found that the evidence did not allow a definite conclusion to be drawn as to whether the earlier mark had a reputation. In addition, it held that the relevant public would not establish a link between the marks.
• The applicant argued before the Court that the statement of reasons in the Board of Appeal’s decision was internally inconsistent. In its view, the Board of Appeal had, on the one hand, accepted genuine use of the earlier mark and, on the other hand, stated that there was no evidence that the term Obelix would be perceived as an indication of commercial origin.
• The Court rejected that plea. It held that the Board of Appeal had not found that genuine use of the earlier mark had been proved, but had merely assumed this for reasons of procedural economy. There was therefore no inconsistency in the statement of reasons.
• As regards reputation, however, the Court held that the Board of Appeal had carried out an erroneous and incomplete assessment of the evidence. In particular, it had wrongly disregarded or minimised evidence indicating use of the sign Obelix as a trade mark, including products on which the sign Obelix or Obelix appeared together with the registered trade mark symbol (R).
• The Court emphasised that the presence of the registered trade mark symbol (R) next to the sign Obelix could indicate to the relevant public that the sign was a registered trade mark and therefore an indication of the commercial origin of the goods.
• The Court also held that the Board of Appeal had been wrong, as a matter of principle, to exclude evidence relating to the combined sign Asterix & Obelix. Under EU trade mark law, there is no requirement for the proprietor of the earlier mark to prove use of that mark only on its own, independently of other marks. Two or more marks may be used simultaneously, provided that this does not alter the distinctive character of the registered mark.
• In the Court’s view, the sign Obelix may be perceived separately even when it is used together with the sign Asterix, especially where each of those signs appears with a separate registered trade mark symbol (R).
• Consequently, the Court found that the Board of Appeal had failed to assess the reputation of the earlier mark on the basis of all relevant evidence and circumstances.
• The Court then examined the Board of Appeal’s alternative position that, even if reputation had been proved, the relevant public would not establish a link between the marks.
• The Board of Appeal relied mainly on the complete dissimilarity of the goods and services, the absence of proximity between the market sectors and the lack of overlap between the relevant publics. It stressed that the goods in Class 13 were directed at a very specific public, such as military personnel, hunters, security specialists and police officers, whereas the earlier mark was directed at the general public. It concluded that the overlap between the relevant publics required by the case-law did not exist.
• The Court held that that assessment was incomplete. The existence of a link between the marks must be assessed globally, taking account of all relevant circumstances, including the degree of similarity between the marks, the strength of the earlier mark’s reputation, the nature of the goods and services, the relevant public, the degree of distinctive character of the earlier mark and any likelihood of confusion.
• The Court stated that the marks at issue were identical. However, the Board of Appeal had not established or assessed the degree of distinctive character of the earlier mark, whether inherent or acquired through use.
• Since the Board of Appeal focused essentially on the dissimilarity of the goods and services and the absence of overlap between the relevant publics, without examining all relevant factors, the Court held that it had infringed Article 8(5) of Regulation 2017/1001.
• Consequently, the General Court annulled the decision of the Second Board of Appeal of EUIPO. EUIPO and WORKS 11 MICHAL LUBINSKI were ordered to bear their own costs and each to pay one half of the costs incurred by Les Editions Albert Rene.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025TJ0024

2.    Judgment T-105/25 Kutxabank / EUIPO – Klarna Bank (K.)

• The case concerned opposition proceedings against the application filed by Klarna Bank AB for registration of the EU figurative mark K. for services in Classes 35, 36, 39, 42 and 45 of the Nice Classification.
• Kutxabank, SA filed a notice of opposition to registration of the mark applied for. The opposition was based, inter alia, on earlier EU figurative marks representing the letter k and the sign k kutxabank kredit, registered for services in Classes 35 and 36, in particular advertising, business, insurance, financial, monetary and banking services.
• The opposition was based on Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation No 207/2009, that is to say, likelihood of confusion. Kutxabank also relied on Article 8(5) of that regulation.
• The Opposition Division upheld the opposition in its entirety, finding that a likelihood of confusion could not be excluded between the mark applied for, K., and the earlier mark representing the letter k.
• The Board of Appeal allowed Klarna Bank’s appeal in part. It annulled the decision of the Opposition Division in respect of services in Classes 35, 39, 42 and 45, finding that there was no likelihood of confusion for those services. It maintained, however, the refusal of registration of the mark applied for in respect of services in Class 36.
• Kutxabank challenged the decision of the Board of Appeal in so far as it concerned services in Classes 35, 39, 42 and 45. It argued that the Board had wrongly found that those services were dissimilar to the services covered by the earlier marks. Klarna Bank, for its part, brought a cross-claim seeking annulment of the decision in so far as the opposition had been upheld for services in Class 36.
• The Court first examined the comparison of the services in relation to the earlier mark representing the letter k, registered for services in Class 36: insurance, financial affairs and monetary affairs.
• As regards the services in Class 39, such as logistics, distribution, transport, shipping of goods and tracking and tracing of documents and parcels, the Court held that they had a different nature, purpose and method of use from insurance, financial and monetary services. Kutxabank had not put forward arguments capable of effectively calling that assessment into question.
• The Court also confirmed that services in Class 35, such as invoicing, book-keeping services and loyalty and affinity programme services, were not similar to financial and monetary services. Book-keeping services are, as a rule, provided by accountants, whereas financial and monetary services are provided by banks or financial institutions. There is no relationship of competition or substitutability between them.
• As regards services in Class 42, including the provision of temporary use of online non-downloadable software for electronic payments, credit assessment and financial transactions, the Court held that such services may facilitate the provision of financial services, but that this did not make them similar. Those services have a different nature, purpose and method of use and are provided by operators in a different sector, in particular the technology and IT sector.
• The Court also rejected the argument that services in Class 45, such as security services, user authentication, personal background investigations and user verification, were similar to financial or monetary services. Those services relate to the protection of persons and property or the security of transactions, but do not have the same nature or purpose as services in Class 36.
• The Court stated that the mere possibility of using certain services as ancillary services in the provision of financial services is not sufficient for them to be regarded as similar or complementary. Complementarity requires a close connection, in the sense that one service is indispensable or important for the use of the other, in such a way that consumers may think that responsibility for providing them lies with the same undertaking.
• As regards the earlier mark k kutxabank kredit, the Court reached similar conclusions. The services in Class 39 applied for by Klarna Bank were not similar to the services in Classes 35 and 36 covered by the earlier mark. The Court emphasised that services in Class 35, even if they may include commercial or import-export activities, do not include the transport of goods itself.
• The Court also held that the services in Classes 42 and 45 applied for by Klarna Bank were neither similar nor complementary to the services in Class 36 covered by the earlier mark k kutxabank kredit. Kutxabank’s arguments in that regard essentially repeated the submissions made in relation to the first earlier mark and were also rejected.
• The Court then examined the similarity between the mark applied for, K., and the earlier mark k kutxabank kredit in relation to services in Class 35, which the Board of Appeal had found to be identical.
• The Court stated that the mark applied for consisted of the letter K and a dot, whereas the earlier mark contained a stylised letter k and the word elements kutxabank and kredit. Those elements are visible, legible and occupy a significant part of the earlier mark, and the comparison therefore cannot be limited solely to the letter k.
• As regards visual similarity, the Court held that the signs were similar only to a low degree. They share the presence of the letter k, but differ in the additional word elements kutxabank and kredit and in their graphic stylisation.
• As regards phonetic similarity, the Court agreed with the Board of Appeal that the signs were, at most, similar to a very low degree. The earlier mark will most likely be pronounced as kutxabank kredit or kutxabank, whereas the mark applied for will be pronounced as the letter k alone.
• As regards conceptual similarity, the Court held that the signs were different. The letter k alone has no particular meaning, whereas the element kutxabank will be associated by a significant part of the public with the concept of a bank.
• In the context of the global assessment, the Court held that, despite the identity of the services in Class 35, there was no likelihood of confusion between the mark applied for, K., and the earlier mark k kutxabank kredit. Decisive importance was attached to the low degree of similarity between the signs, the conceptual difference, the average distinctive character of the earlier mark and the high level of attention of the relevant public.
• The Court therefore dismissed Kutxabank’s action in its entirety.
• The Court then examined Klarna Bank’s cross-claim concerning the services in Class 36. Klarna Bank argued that the Board of Appeal had wrongly found that there was a likelihood of confusion between the mark applied for, K., and the earlier mark representing the letter k.
• The Court confirmed that the services in Class 36 covered by the mark applied for and by the earlier mark were identical. They included, inter alia, insurance, financial, monetary and banking services, electronic payment services, credit assessment, loans, factoring and money transfer services.
• As regards the comparison of the signs, the Court stated that both signs represented a stylised letter k. The mark applied for contained a black capital letter K and a black dot at the bottom right. The earlier mark contained a black lower-case letter k with three white dots and one red dot positioned at the ends of the letter.
• The Court held that the signs differed in the number, colour and positioning of the dots and in certain details of the stylisation of the letter k, but that those differences were not sufficient to produce a different overall impression. The common element consisting of the bold, black, stylised letter k was important for the visual perception of the signs.
• In the Court’s view, the signs were visually similar to an above-average degree. The Court noted that the Board of Appeal had underestimated the degree of visual similarity by characterising it as below average, but that error had no impact on the outcome, since it still led to a finding of likelihood of confusion.
• As regards phonetic similarity, the Court held that the signs were identical. Both will be perceived and pronounced as the letter k. The Court rejected Klarna Bank’s argument that the mark applied for would be pronounced as K dot, since there was no basis for assuming that consumers would pronounce the dot appearing next to the letter.
• The conceptual comparison was neutral, since it had not been shown that the letter k had a specific meaning in any of the languages of the European Union.
• In the context of the global assessment, the Court held that there was a likelihood of confusion for services in Class 36. Decisive importance was attached to the identity of the services, the above-average visual similarity of the signs, their phonetic identity and the average distinctive character of the earlier mark.
• The Court emphasised that even the heightened level of attention of consumers of financial services did not preclude a likelihood of confusion in the present case.
• The Court also rejected Klarna Bank’s argument concerning the monopolisation of the letter k. A finding of likelihood of confusion does not lead to protection of the letter k as such, but to protection of the specific combination of elements making up the earlier mark.
• Consequently, the Court dismissed Klarna Bank’s cross-claim.
• The Court also dismissed Kutxabank’s action in its entirety.
• Kutxabank was ordered to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by EUIPO in the context of the main action. Klarna Bank was ordered to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by EUIPO in the context of the cross-claim.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025TJ0105

3.    Judgment T-390/25 Ixo Restauracion / EUIPO – Promollum 142 B (MUKA) (translated from Spanish)

• The case concerned invalidity proceedings against the EU figurative mark MUKA, registered by Ixo Restauracion, S. L. for restaurant services in Class 43 of the Nice Classification.
• The application for a declaration of invalidity was filed by Promollum 142 B, S. L., relying in particular on the earlier Spanish word mark LAMUCCA, registered for restaurant services in Class 43.
• The application for a declaration of invalidity was based on Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) and Article 8(5) of that regulation.
• At the request of Ixo Restauracion, EUIPO invited Promollum 142 B to furnish proof of genuine use of the earlier mark. Promollum 142 B submitted, inter alia, a declaration concerning authorisation for companies in the LAMUCCA restaurant group to use the LAMUCCA marks, press articles, corporate tax returns, VAT returns, supplier statements, till receipts, simplified invoices and supplier invoices.
• The Cancellation Division upheld the application for a declaration of invalidity on the basis of Article 60(1)(a) of Regulation 2017/1001, read in conjunction with Article 8(1)(b) of that regulation.
• The Board of Appeal dismissed Ixo Restauracion’s appeal. It found that the evidence submitted was sufficient to prove genuine use of the earlier mark LAMUCCA for restaurant services and that there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the relevant public.
• The Court first examined the pleas relating to genuine use of the earlier mark. It stated that the relevant periods of use were, respectively, from 20 September 2018 to 19 September 2023 and from 8 April 2017 to 7 April 2022.
• The Court held that the evidence submitted by Promollum 142 B related to use of the sign LAMUCCA in connection with restaurant services during the relevant periods. In particular, the till receipts issued under the earlier mark concerned prepared dishes and indicated the place where they were consumed in the restaurant, for example on the terrace or in the dining room.
• The Court also referred to invoices concerning supplies of large quantities of cutlery, cooking ingredients and beverages to restaurants providing services under the LAMUCCA mark, as well as press articles indicating that certain restaurants offered menus under the earlier mark.
• Consequently, the Court rejected Ixo Restauracion’s argument that most of the evidence concerned food products in Class 29 or retail services for bakery products in Class 35, rather than restaurant services in Class 43.
• The Court also rejected the argument that some of the invoices were issued to third parties with no link to the earlier mark. It noted that the invoices mentioned, inter alia, the restaurants Lamucca Andes, Lamucca Carmen and Lamucca Fuencarral, and that the file showed that use of the earlier mark by those restaurants had been authorised by Promollum 142 B.
• The Court also held that use of the sign LAMUCCA as a company name, trade name or designation of a restaurant group did not preclude its use as a trade mark, provided that the services concerned were identified and offered on the market under that sign.
• Consequently, the Court confirmed that the earlier mark LAMUCCA had been put to genuine use for restaurant services in Class 43.
• The Court then examined the likelihood of confusion. It confirmed that the relevant public consisted of the Spanish public at large, with an average level of attention.
• The Court stated that the services covered by the marks were identical, since both the contested mark MUKA and the earlier mark LAMUCCA concerned restaurant services in Class 43.
• As regards the comparison of the signs, the Court explained that the Board of Appeal had not artificially split the earlier sign LAMUCCA into the elements „la” and „mucca”. It assessed the likelihood of confusion from the perspective of the part of the public which perceives the sign LAMUCCA as a whole.
• As regards visual similarity, the Court held that the signs were similar to a low degree. They coincide in the letters „m”, „u” and „a”, which appear in the same order. However, they differ in length, in the presence of the initial element „la” in the earlier sign, in the element „cc” in the earlier sign and in the letter „k” in the contested sign. The slight stylisation of the MUKA sign had no significant impact on the visual comparison.
• As regards phonetic similarity, the Court held that the signs were similar to a high degree. In Spanish, the element „cc” in the sign LAMUCCA is pronounced in the same way as the letter „k” in the sign MUKA. Consequently, the pronunciation of the sign MUKA corresponds to the second and third syllables of the sign LAMUCCA, namely „mu” and „cca”.
• The Court emphasised that the contested sign MUKA is phonetically entirely included in the earlier sign LAMUCCA. The difference in the number of syllables and the presence of the syllable „la” at the beginning of the earlier sign are not sufficient to exclude a high degree of phonetic similarity.
• The Court rejected Ixo Restauracion’s argument that the double consonant „cc” in the sign LAMUCCA gave it a different cadence. Since in Spanish „cc” is pronounced in the same way as „k”, that difference does not lead to a different phonetic perception.
• As regards conceptual comparison, the Court held that it was not possible for a non-negligible part of the Spanish public. The sign LAMUCCA, considered as a whole, has no meaning for that part of the public. It cannot be assumed that Spanish consumers know the Italian word „mucca”, meaning „cow”. The Court also stated that the Italian word „mucca” differs from the Spanish word „vaca” and from equivalents in other Romance languages, so the Spanish public will not automatically establish a link between those terms.
• As regards the sign MUKA, the Court held that its meaning in Basque would not be understood by the part of the Spanish public that does not know Basque. The fact that Basque is a co-official language in Spain is not decisive, because what matters is the actual level of knowledge of that language among the relevant public.
• The Court also confirmed that the earlier mark LAMUCCA had a normal degree of inherent distinctiveness.
• In the context of the global assessment, the Court held that there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. Decisive importance was attached to the identity of the services, the high degree of phonetic similarity between the signs, the low degree of visual similarity, the impossibility of carrying out a conceptual comparison for a non-negligible part of the public and the normal distinctive character of the earlier mark.
• The Court also rejected the plea alleging the absence of unfair advantage taken of the reputation of the earlier mark. It stated that the Board of Appeal had upheld the application for a declaration of invalidity solely on the basis of Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation 2017/1001 and had not ruled on the ground based on Article 8(5) of that regulation. That plea was therefore ineffective.
• The Court also rejected the plea alleging breach of the principle of proportionality. It held that the Boards of Appeal are required to apply the provisions of Regulation 2017/1001 and that the economic consequences of invalidating a mark cannot, in themselves, demonstrate a breach of the principle of proportionality.
• The Court also found no breach of the obligation to state reasons. The Board of Appeal explained why it considered the evidence of genuine use of the earlier mark sufficient, why it found that there was a likelihood of confusion and why it rejected the argument concerning coexistence of the sign LAMUCCA with other marks containing the elements „MUCA” or „MUKA”.
• Consequently, the Court dismissed the action in its entirety. Ixo Restauracion was ordered to bear its own costs and to pay the costs incurred by Promollum 142 B. EUIPO was ordered to bear its own costs.

Case details: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62025TJ0390